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[Crim. No. 5769. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.J 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. PAUL EDSON GALE, 
Respondent. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Reasonableness.-Since an automobile 
may readily be moved from place to place, its searcl! without 
a warrant is not unreasonable if the officer has reasonable 
cause to believe it is carrying contraband. 
[2] Id.-Justification for.-The mere possibility that automobiles 
are being used to further criminal ventures cannot justify 
stopping and searching all automobiles being lawfully used 
on the highways in the hope that some criminals will be found. 
IS] Arrest-Without Warrant.-The mere fact that the front.end 
of defendant's automobile was damaged would not constitute 
reasonable cause for his arrest for hit-and-run driving (Veh. 
Code, § 480). 
[4] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-Assuming that the 
damaged condition of an automobile would justify the officers 
in stopping it and questioning the driver, when that ques-
tioning elicited an explanation consistent with innocence no 
[1] See Oal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
licK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4, 7, 8] Searches and Seizures, § 1; 
[3] Arrest, § 5; [5, 6] Criminal Law, § 410. 
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basis was established for arresting him and searching him 
and his car. 
[5] Criminal Law-Evidence-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful 
Seizure.-Where a narcotic was discovered when an auto-
mobile in defendant's possession was subjected to an unreason-
able search, the narcotic was obtained in violation of his con-
stitutional rights and may not be used as evidence against 
him. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-
Whenever evidence is obtained in violation of eonstitutioD!ll 
guarantees, such evidence is inadmissible whether or not it 
was obtained in violation of the particular defendant's con-
stitutional rights. 
[7] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-A search of an auto-
mobile is not lawful on the ground that the ear is forfeited to 
the state when used to transport narcoties where there has 
been no judgment forfeiting the car to the state. 
[8] Id.-Justification for.-A search cannot be justified by what it 
turns IIp. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County granting motion to set aside an information. 
John A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellant. 
Giles B. Jackson and H. Clay J acke for Respondent. 
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By information defendant was charged 
with one count of possessing a narcotic in violation of Health 
and Safety Code, section 11500, a felony. His motion to set 
the information aside (see Pen. Code, § 995) was granted 
on the ground that all of the evidence against him was ob-
tained by an illegal search and seizure in violation of his 
constitutional rights. The People appeal. 
Defendant was arrested after he had stopped at approxi-
mately 12 :15 a. m. on April 9, 1955, at the San Diego County 
sheriff's check station at the Mexican border. He was driving 
toward Mexico with a friend in a car registered in his mother's 
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name. He told the officers that the car belonged to him. One 
of the officers noticed that the front of the car appeared to 
have been in a recent accident and asked defendant to drive 
to the side of the road and stop in front of the sheriff's 
substation office. Defendant got out and told one of the 
officers that the car had been damaged in an accident about 
a month before in Los Angeles. This officer asked defendant 
and his friend to come into the office and told another officer 
to give the car a complete "shake-down." With the aid of 
his flashlight, the inspeJting officer found under the right 
hand side of the front seat a spoon, a capsule of white sub-
stance, a needle, a medicine dropper, and a small scabbard. 
The white substance was later identified as a narcotic. The 
first officer examined defendant's arm and found old puncture 
marks, and defendant told him he had not used any heroin for 
a long time. A recent puncture mark was found on the 
friend's arm, and he told the officer that he had had a shot 
of heroin earlier in the day in Los Angeles. Both defendant 
and his friend told the officer that they did not know how 
the articles found under the front seat got into the car and 
that neither of them had ever seen them before. Defendant 
was searched and three papers taken from his wallet were 
introduced in evidence. On each of them there appeared to 
be a drawing of a map. The officer asked defendant what 
it was and he said he did not know. The officer then suggested 
to him that it was a map of the Tijuana area made for a 
narcotic contact, but defendant denied it. At the preliminary 
hearing the court sustained objections to defendant's ques-
tions. designed to elicit from the officers their purpose in 
stopping and checking automobiles. There was testimony, 
however, that the officers were making a routine search of 
vehicles. "That is one of the purposes of the road block, sir, 
is to curb the juvenile problem and also check for, well, any-
thing that we might find, anything that looked suspicious." 
The attorney general contends that the search of tlle 
automobile in this case was reasonable whether or not it was 
incidental to a lawful arrest. 
[1] Since an automobile may readily be moved from 
place to place, its search without a warrant is not unreason-
able if the officer has reasonable cause to believe it is carrying 
contraband. (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [45 
8.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790]; Husty v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 [51 8. Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 
74 A.L.R. 1407] ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254-
) 
) 
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basis was established for arresting him and searching him 
and his car. 
[5] Criminal Law-Evidence-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful 
Seizure.-Where a narcotic was discovered when an auto· 
mobile in defendant's possession was subjected to an unreason-
able search, the narcotic was obtained in violation of his con-
stitutional rights and may not be used as evidence against 
him. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-
Whenever evidence is obtained in violation of constitutional 
guarantees, such evidence is inadmissible whether or not it 
was obtained in violation of the particular defendant's con-
stitutional rights. 
[7] Searches and Seizures-Justification tor.-A search of an auto-
mobile is not lawful on the ground that the car is forfeited to 
the state when used to transport narcotics where there has 
been no judgment forfeiting the car to the Btate. 
[8] Id.-Justification for.-A search cannot be justified by what it 
turns up. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County granting motion to set aside an information. 
John A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellant. 
Giles B. Jackson and H. Clay Jacke for Respondent. 
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By information defendant was charged 
with one count of possessing a narcotic in violation of Health 
and Safety Code, section 11500, a felony. His motion to set 
the information aside (see Pen. Code, § 995) was granted 
on the ground that aU of the evidence against him was ob-
tained by an illegal search and seizure in violation of his 
constitutional rights. The People appeal. 
Defendant was arrested after he had stopped at approxi-
mately 12 :15 a. m. on April 9, 1955, at the San Diego County 
sheriff's check station at the Mexican border. He was driving 
toward Mexico with a friend in a car registered in his mother's 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393 
et seq. 
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name. He told the officers that the car belonged to him. One 
of the officers noticed that the front of the car appeared to 
have been in a recent accident and asked defendant to drive 
to the side of the road and stop in front of the sheriff's 
substation office. Defendant got out and told one of the 
officers that the car had been damaged in an accident about 
a month before in Los Angeles. This officer asked defendant 
and his friend to come into the office and told another officer 
to give the car a complete "shake-down." y.rith the aid of 
his flashlight, the inspecting officer found under the right 
hand side of the front seat a spoon, a capsule of white sub-
stance, a needle, a medicine dropper, and a small scabbard. 
The white substance was later identified as a narcotic. The 
first officer examined defendant's arm and found old puncture 
marks, and defendant told him he had not used any heroin for 
a long time. A recent puncture mark was found on the 
friend's arm, and he told the officer that he had had a shot 
of heroin earlier in the day in Los Angeles. Both defendant 
and his friend told the officer that they did not know how 
the articles found under the front seat got into the car and 
that neither of them had ever seen them before. Defendant 
was searched and three papers taken from his wallet were 
introduced in evidence. On each of them there appeared to 
be a drawing of a map. The officer asked defendant what 
it was and he said he did not know. The officer then suggested 
to him that it was a map of the Tijuana area made for a 
narcotic contact, but defendant denied it. .At the preliminary 
hearing the court sustained objections to defendant's ques-
tions designed to elicit from the officers their purpose in 
stopping and checking automobiles. There was testimony, 
however, that the officers were making a routine search of 
vehicles. "That is one of the purposes of the road block, sir, 
is to curb the juvenile problem and also check for, well, any-
thing that we might find, anything that looked suspicious." 
The attorney general contends that the search of the 
automobile in this case was reasonable whether or not it was 
incidental to a lawful arrest. 
[1] Since an automobile may r~adi1y be moved· from 
place to place, its search without a warrant is not unreason-
able if the officer has reasonable cause to believe it is carrying 
contraband. (Oarroll v. U1tited States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 [45 
8. Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790]; Husty v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 [51 8. Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 
74 A.L.R. 1407] ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254-
) 
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255 [59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151) ; Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 164 [69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879).) The fore-
going cases all recognized, however, that ordinarily in the 
absence of such reasonable cause, or the right to arrest an 
occupant of the automobile, its search is not permissible 
without a warrant. "It would be intolerable and unreasonable 
if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every auto-
mobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all 
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience 
and indignity of such a search." (Carroll v. United States, 
supra, 267 U.S. 132, 153·154; accord: Wirin v. HorraZl, 85 
Cal.App.2d 497,501 [193 P.2d 470) ; Pearson v. United States, 
150 F.2d 219, 221 ; Smith v. State, 182 Tenn. 158 [184 S.W.2d 
390, 391]; see also United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 
584·586 [68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210).) 
[2] The attorney general seeks to avoid the effect of the 
foregoing rule in this case on the ground that the car was 
stopped and searched at the international border. He points 
out that the Carroll case recognized that travelers coming 
into the country may be stopped and searched to prevent 
illegal entry of persons or property and contends that persons 
leaving the country may also be stopped and searched to 
prevent illegal departures or exports. It does not appear, 
nor is it contended, however, that the deputy sheriffs were 
attempting to enforce any law, state or federal, dealing with 
the movement of persons or property into or out of the country 
or that they were attempting to apprehend any known fleeing 
criminals. They were conducting a routine search of vehicles 
"to curb the juvenile problem and also check for, well, any-
thing that we might find, anything that looked suspicious." 
It is unnecessary to determine whether county officers may 
lawfully conduct routine searches of persons entering the 
country or whether such authority is limited to federal offi-
cers. In the present case, cars stopped and searched were 
leaving the country, and the possibility that such cars were 
being used to further criminal ventures was certainly of no 
greater concern to local officers than the possibility of similar 
use within the county. As the cases cited above establish, how-
ever, that possibility alone cannot justify stopping and search-
ing all automobiles being lawfully used on the highways in 
the hope that some criminals will be found. 
[3] The attorney general contends that since the front 
I\f the car appeared to have been in a recent accident, the 
officers had reasonable eause to arrest defendant for hit-and-
Feb. 1956] PEOPLE v. GAIJE 
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run driving. (Veh. Code, § 480.) In view of the large 
number of traffic accidents and the fact that only a small 
percentage of these involve violations of Vehicle Code, section 
480, however, t.he mere fact that the front end of the car was 
damaged would not constitute reasonable cause to believe 
defendant had violated that section. (See Hughes v. Oreb, 
36 Ca1.2d 854, 858 [228 P.2d 550].) Moreover, it does not 
appear, nor is it contended, that the car's lights were defective 
or that there was any reason to believe its equipment did not 
comply with the provisions of the Vehicle Code, or that the 
officers were conducting an investigation authorized by that 
code. (See Veh. Code, § 680.) [4] Even if it is assumed 
that the damaged condition of the car would justify the 
officers in stopping it and questioning the driver (see People 
v. Marvin, 358 Ill. 426 [193 N.E. 202, 203] ; Smith v. State, 
supra, 182 Tenn. 158 [184 S.W.2d 390, 391]; People v. 
Simon, 45 Ca1.2d 645, 649-651 [290 P.2d 531]), when 
that questioning elicited an explanation wholly consistent 
with innocence, no basis was established for arresting de-
fendant and searching him and his car. 
[5] The attorney general contends that defendant has 
no standing to object to the seizure of the narcotic on the 
ground that he denied it was his. Defendant's rights were 
violated, however, when the car in his possession was subjected 
to an unreasonable search. (See United States v. Jeffers, 
342 U.S. 48, 52-54 [72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59] ; Alvau v. United 
States, 33 F.2d 467, 470; Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534, 
537; S()()ggins v. United States, 202 F.2d 211, 212; United 
States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019, 1021.) Since the narcotic was 
discovered as a result of that search, it was obtained in viola-
tion of defendant's constitutional rights and may not be used 
as evidence against him. (Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 [40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, 24 
A.L.R. 1426] ; People v. Berger, 44 Ca1.2d 459, 462 [282 P.2d 
509].) [6] Moreover, in People v. Martin, 45 Ca1.2d 755. 
761 [290 P.2d 855], we held that "whenever evidence is ob-
tained in violation of constitutional guarantees, such evidence 
is inadmissible whether or not it was obtained in violation 
of the particular defendant's constitutional rights." 
[7] Similarly, there is no merit in the attorney general's 
contention that the search was lawful on the ground that 
the car was forfeited to the state. The record does not dis-
close that there was a judgment forfeiting the car to the 
• c.Jd.-.,e 
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state, and even if it is assumed that a forfeiture would relate 
back to the time of the seizure, it would still be necessary for 
the state to base its right to forfeiture on the fruits of an un-
reasonable search. [8] It is settled, however, that a search 
cannot be justified by what it turns up. (People v. Brown, 
45 Ca1.2d 640, 643 [290 P.2d 528].) 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
Defendant was charged by information with the possession 
of a narcotic in violation of Health and Safety Code, section 
11500, a felony. The majority opinion affirms an order 
setting aside the information upon the ground that all the 
incriminating evidence was obtained by an alleged "un-
reasonable" search in violation of defendant's constitutional 
rights. I cannot agree with the conclusion reached in the 
majority opinion, as I believe that the search was reasoDable, 
and was not therefore in violation of the constitutional guaran-
tees against "unreasonable searches and seizures." (U.S. 
Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 19.) 
The facts in the present case are essentially different from 
those in any other case which has been presented; and the 
conclusion that the search was. reasonable may be rested 
solely upon its inherent reasonableness under the circum-
stances, and without regard to the question of whether such 
search was made as an incident of a lawful arrest. 
The facts are adequately set forth in the majority opinion. 
The search was made shol"tly after midnight "at the San 
Diego County sheriff's check station at the Mexican border" 
in a .. routine check" made as defendant was driving the 
automobile along the public highway toward Mexico. Under 
these circumstances, it is my opinion that any mch "routine 
search" at the border by local or federal officers is entirely 
reasonable. 
The privilege of entering or leaving this state and country 
at the international border is one that must necessarily be 
subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of the en-
forcement of domestic and international law ; and one seeking 
that privilege should not be heard to object to any routine 
search of his person and automobile made by any duly au-
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such searches by federal officers are customarily made in the 
enforcement of our customs and other regulations; and that 
such searches are customarily made by state and federal 
officers in the enforcement of regulations designed to prevent 
the spread of disease among persons, animals and crops, as 
well as in the enforcement of other regulations. It is further 
a matter of common knowledge that crime in general has 
assumed international proportions, and that the international 
traffic in contraband articles, and particularly narcotics, has 
become a serious menace to society, not only in this state and 
country but in all countries including those bordering on our 
own. It is therefore essential that routine searches at the 
borders be not only permitted but encouraged if we are to 
have any system of law enforcement that is worthy of the 
name. No authority has been called to our attention holding 
that such a routine search violates any constitutional.guaran-
tee; and it is indicated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, at page 154 [45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790], 
that searches at the international borders are distinguishable 
from other searches. 
I am therefore of the opinion that no invasion of any 
constitutional right may be predicated merely upon a routine 
search by duly authorized officers at the international border 
of the person and automobile of one seeking the privilege of 
entering or leaving this state and country; and as it is un-
disputed that defendant was seeking that privilege, I conclude 
that the search was reasonable, and that the evidence ob-
tained through that search was properly admitted at the 
preliminary hearing. 
In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to determine 
here whether the search may be justified upon the further 
ground that it was an incident of a lawful arrest. 
I would reverse the order dismissing the information. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 21, 
1956. Shenk, J., and Spl?llCe, J., were of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
